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Eminent Domain-Right to Compensation for Covenants
on Condemned Land
X conveyed part of a tract of land to Y. An easement for
ingress and egress was also given Y across land adjoining these
premises. The deed contained a covenant that whenever the premises over which said easement was granted was improved for street
purposes, Y, her heirs and assigns, agreed to pay their proportionate
share of the expenses. D (city) obtained Y's property by eminent
domain but X was not made a party to the appropriation proceeding
against Y. Afterwards, X conveyed to P the part of tract remaining,
over which the easement for ingress and egress was granted. After
P made improvements on the premises over which the easement was
granted, he sued D on the covenant to recover a money judgment
for a part of the cost of the public street which he constructed. A
demurrer to P's petition was sustained and judgment entered for
D. Held, reversed, as P's predecessor in title, X, had an interest in
the appropriated property and was not made a party in the appropriation proceeding, X's interest in the appropriated property was
never taken. As the covenant ran with the land, P had a compensable interest in this adjoining land. Hughes v. City of Cincinnati,
195 N.E.2d 552 (Ohio 1964).
Both the federal and state constitutions protect private property
owners from having their property taken by the government without
just compensation. The fifth amendment of the federal constitution
requires the payment of just compensation when private property
is taken for public use. West Virginia's constitution provides an
even broader protection for private landowners: "Private property
shall not be taken or damaged for public use, without just compensation; . . . ." (Emphasis added) W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 9.
The principal case deals with the problem of what is an interest
in land for which the condemning body must give just compensation. The general rule is that the term "owner," as used in statutes
relating to condemnation proceedings, should be construed to include
every person having any interest in the property to be taken. Annot.,
2 A.L.R. 778, 785 (1919); 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 229
(1938). It does not matter whether the owner has a legal or equitable interest in the property condemned. Swanson v. United States,
156 F.2d 442 (9th Cir. 1946).
In some cases, it is not difficult to establish the identity of the
compensable owners of property interests. Naturally, the owner
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of a fee simple would receive all the condemnation proceeds. When
a leasehold interest is involved, the tenant for years has an interest
in the leased property and is entitled to a share of the compensation
in the event that the lease itself does not include a provision in
respect to the rights of the parties in the event of condemnation.
United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372 (1946); Gawzner
v. Lebenbaum, 180 F.2d 610 (9th Cir. 1950). The life tenant and
remainderman or reversioner are entitled to compensation when the
land is taken for public use. Webster v. Pittsburg C. & T. R., 78
Ohio St. 87, 84 N.E. 592 (1908). It is a well established rule that
when mortgaged land is condemned the mortgagee's rights against
the land follow the award and the mortgagee may have the mortgage
debt satisfied out of the condemnation proceeds in advance of other
creditors of the mortgagor. City of Chicago v. Sallinger, 384 Ill.
515, 52 N.E.2d 184 (1944).
A lien is generally held not to be a compensable interest in the
condemned land. Williams v. Hutchinson & So. Ry., 62 Kan. 412,
63 Pac. 430 (1901). But the lien of a judgment creditor recorded
prior to the condemnation proceedings may not be ignored and
attaches to the condemnation proceeds. Barnett v. O'Neal, 270 Ala.
58, 116 So. 2d 375 (1959). Also, condemnation proceeds may be
reduced by the amount of unpaid taxes and assessments. Annot.,
79 A.L.R. 116, 121 (1932). A wife's inchoate right of dower is
not a compensable interest in condemned property. Shelton v.
Shelton, 225 S.C. 502, 83 S.E.2d 176 (1954). Neither is a bare
option to purchase the condemned property compensable. Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. City of Omaha, 171 Neb. 457, 106 N.W.2d 727
(1960).
More difficult is the problem of whether possibilities of reverter
or rights of entry for condition broken are compensable interests
in eminent domain proceedings. Whether such is a compensable
interest depends on the likelihood of the termination of the possessory
estate. If the occurrence of the event which would terminate a
determinable fee or authorize a re-entry for breach of condition is
not probable, the owner of the possessory estate is ordinarily entitled to all of the condemnation award as if he were the owner
in fee simple. Scovill v. McMahon, 62 Conn. 378, 26 At. 479
(1892). If it appears that there is a good chance the possessory
estate might terminate, the award should be divided among the
parties in their proportionate shares. In Chew v. Commonwealth,
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400 Pa. 307, 161 A.2d 621 (1960), a railroad had acquired a
fee simple title subject to being defeated if the railroad ever abandoned this land as a right of way. Prior to condemnation of this
land, the railroad had applied for permission to abandon land as a
railroad. The court held that the abandonment was so probable
and imminent as to make grantor's right of reverter a valuable
property right which was subject to compensation.
The property interest in the principal case is analogous to a
restrictive covenant. Restrictive covenants are to prevent subsequent owners from using the property in a certain manner while the
covenant in the principal case called for affirmative action on the
part of such owners. All restrictive covenants constitute at least
an equitable easement or servitude. But the cases are in irrecontiliable conflict in determining whether the right thus created is one
of property for which compensation must be made when land subject to such right is taken by eminent domain. Annot., 122 A.L.R.
1464 (1939). Certain authorities take the position that building
restrictions are a property right and where, through the exercise of
the power of eminent domain there is a taking or damaging of such
property rights, the owners of property for whose benefit the restrictions are imposed are entitled to compensation for the loss of
the easements created by such restrictions. 2 NICHOLs, EMINENT
DoMaiN § 5.73 (1963); 18 AM. JUR. Eminent Domain § 157
(1938). In Board of Pub. Instruction v. Town of Bay Harbor
Islands, 81 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 1955), the court disagreed with the
authorities as to what was the majority rule and held the better rule
to be that restrictions on town lots do not give owners of all lots
in the subdivision a property right for which compensation must
be paid if such lots are taken for and devoted to public use in violation of the restrictions.
From an examination of cases, there appears to be an equal
weight of authority on both sides. 53 MICH. L. REv. 451, 453
(1955). The federal courts have recently adopted the view that a
restrictive covenant imposing a duty which runs with the land taken
constitutes a compensable interest. Adaman Mut. Water Co. v.
United States, 278 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1960); United States v.
Certain Land, 220 F. Supp. 696 (S.D. Me. 1963). Compensation
must be made where the taking of property under eminent domain
violates building restrictions placed thereon for benefit of every
other lot in the subdivision as each of the owners of the respective
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lots regarded the restrictive agreement as something which added
to the value of their land. Burges v. City of St. Paul, 241 Minn.
285, 64 N.W.2d 73 (1954); City of Shelbyville v. Kilpatrick, 204
Tenn. 484, 322 S.W.2d 203 (1959).
But other courts have held to the contrary. Restrictive covenants
do not rise to the dignity of an estate in the land itself but are contractual rights not binding on the sovereign contemplating a public
use of the particular property taken. Friesen v. City of Glendale,
209 Cal. 524, 288 Pac. 1080 (1930); Anderson v. Lynch, 188
Ga. 154, 3 S.E.2d 85 (1939). In State v. City of Dunbar, 142
W. Va. 332, 338, 95 S.E.2d 457, 461 (1956), the court said,
"....

those who enter into such covenants do so with the

knowledge that the government has the absolute right to acquire
lands for governmental purposes, and they can not be presumed to have intended an interference with such right."
Because of the unique fact situation in the principal case, the
court had difficulty in determining whether the covenant was a
compensable interest. Three dissenting judges held that the plaintiff
did not have a compensable interest on the basis that the covenant
was personal and did not run with the land. The Ohio court has
held that owners of a restrictive covenant don't have a compensable
interest. Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Gale, 119 Ohio St. 110, 162 N.E.
385 (1928); Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Ohio St. 461,
112 N.E. 505 (1915). Thus, the majority in the principal case
seem to hold that this covenant created a greater interest in the
land than a restrictive covenant.
Ward Day Stone, Jr.

Equity-Clean Hands
Suit to replace a lost deed. In 1934 A, the sole stockholder and
concededly alter ego of P corporation, conveyed property to B, his
son, without consideration. B agreed to hold the property for A's
benefit. The purpose of the conveyance was to conceal the property from A's creditors. In 1945 A filed a petition in bankruptcy
in which he swore that he had no interest in real property. In 1950
B at A's request conveyed the property to D who was A's son-in-law.
This conveyance was without consideration. A discharged B's earlier
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